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REsumEn
este artículo contribuye al debate sobre el reconocimiento a través de un análisis 
de la relación entre reconocimiento y conflicto social, y explica por qué las teorías 
del reconocimiento son de importancia hoy en día para la teoría política. en un 
primer momento, el artículo presenta las contribuciones de taylor, fraser y honneth 
al debate sobre el reconocimiento. en segundo lugar, se introduce la distinción 
entre conflictos de reconocimiento de tipo agonístico y los de tipo consensuado. 
finalmente, el artículo ilustra las relaciones entre instituciones y reconocimiento y 
los diversos tipos de problemas que un análisis de las demandas de reconocimiento 
debe de enfrentar.  
Palabras clave: política del reconocimiento, política agonística, identidad, movimientos 
sociales, institucionalización. 
AbstrAct 
This article intervenes in the debate going on in philosophy and sociology regarding recognition 
and, in particular, the idea of a struggle of recognition. It seeks to make the meaning of the link 
between recognition and struggle explicit, as well as to discuss reasons for why theories of 
recognition could provide interesting insights into political theory. In a first step, it confronts 
Taylor’s, Fraser’s and Honneth’s contribution to the debate on recognition. In a second step, 
it introduces the distinction between agonistic and consensual struggles of recognition. In a 
third step, it describes the relationships between institutions and recognition and the various 
problems that an analysis of claims for recognition has to tackle with. 
Key words: Politics of recognition, agonistic politics, identity, social movements, 
institutionalization. 
for more than 15 years, there has been a debate going on in philosophy and sociology 
regarding recognition. one of its main themes is the struggle for recognition. this article 
aims to make the meaning of the link between recognition and struggle explicit, as well 
as to discuss reasons for why theories of recognition could provide interesting insights 
into political theory.
What is the use of the notion of the struggle of recognition? a classical answer is that one 
needs to distinguish between the two types of social movements and political struggles. 
instead of being oriented toward just distribution and respect for universal rights, new 
social and political movements would be oriented toward the recognition of identities. from 
an historical (old vs new) as well as from a normative (justice vs identity) standpoint, the 
use of the idea of a struggle for recognition would be to help specify particular collective 
claims. But, a theory of recognition has also other possible uses. it can make the practical 
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and normative dynamics of protest action explicit. an analysis of the various modes by 
which recognition is denied, and of the various practical and normative reactions to such 
denial, can also provide interesting typologies of protest actions.
I.  stRuGGlE FOR RECOGnItIOn anD POlItICs OF IDEntItY
the notion of a politics of identity seems to be closely linked with the debate between 
liberalism and communitarianism. Whereas liberalism claims that individual rights of 
negative freedom have priority over collective rights and rights to positive freedom, 
communitarianism tries to promote rights to “cultural survival”. in this debate, the idea 
of a “politics of identity” refers to the right to defend cultural identities incorporated in 
religion or language under restricted conditions. in charles taylor’s classical contributions 
to this debate, the notion of a “politics of recognition” is identified with such “politics of 
identities”.1 here, “recognition” means collective agreement that these cultural identities 
are part of the possibility of a good life and that, therefore, they have to be protected by laws 
and in institutional settings. in this sense, political endeavours to defend theses cultural 
identities can be conceived of as a “struggle for recognition”, that is, a struggle aimed at 
attaining recognition of given cultural features by members of a political public sphere 
that do not share the same culture. the very notion of recognition, moreover, enables us 
to describe the legitimacy of such claims. as a matter of fact, for people that share given 
cultural features, the very possibility of self realization is undermined if these features 
are stigmatized or structurally devalued. inter-subjective recognition of my identity is a 
precondition for having a good life. thus, this theory of recognition is of interest for two 
reasons: first, it enables one to distinguish the specificity of these political claims and, 
second, it makes the specific legitimacy of theses claims explicit.
indeed, such cultural struggles seem to be a more recent phenomena than struggles for 
human rights or social justice. in a broader sense, the idea of a “politics of recognition” 
is meant to denote the features shared by the “new social movements”. according to 
Nancy fraser, one can distinguish between two kinds of struggles for social justice. 
the first one is exemplified by the classical socialist movement and is oriented toward 
equality in redistribution.2 the second one is exemplified by new social movements and 
aims for equal recognition not only of cultural identities, but also of collective identities 
defined by sexual orientation, gender constructions and ethnic and racial prejudices. for 
fraser, it is impossible to reduce the issue of recognition to that of distribution, and vice 
versa. she also argues that in most social struggles, both of these issues are intertwined. 
for instance, even if feminist or antiracist politics are above all struggles for recognition, 
they also have a distributive aspect (low female incomes, the restriction of foreigners to 
menial jobs, etc.). fraser classifies her position as “perspectivist dualism”: she asserts 
that redistribution and recognition are to be conceived of as two perspectives on justice 
1 see taylor (1992).
2 see fraser (1995).
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and not as autonomous spheres of justice. here, we can see that a theory of recognition 
works toward different aims than it does in taylor. its main intention is to show, on the 
one hand, that the classical political language of socialism is unable to deal with the new 
political claims of gender and ethnicity, but, on the other hand, it makes no sense to try 
to replace a politics of redistribution with a politics of identity.
fraser’s position rests on two premises that have been criticized by axel honneth.3 
from an historical standpoint, one can notice that the struggle for redistribution in the 
labour movement has been closely linked with various kinds of cultural struggles. e. p. 
thompson’s classical book The Making of the English Working Class gives much evidence in 
support of this claim.4 to provide another illustration, it is striking that in the first labour 
newspaper in europe, l’Echo de la Fabrique (lyon, 1831-1834), a public competition was 
organized in order to replace the stigmatized name of the silk workers (“canuts”). and it 
is also interesting to note that in between the two famous revolts of 1831 and 1834, some 
“canuts” proposed to fight for the social honour of their profession with a new name, 
whereas others defended this name and, on the contrary, proposed to reverse the stigma.5 
following honneth, one may wonder if the gap between redistribution and recognition is 
really impossible to bridge. as a matter of fact, many distributive injustices are experienced 
by individuals as a lack of recognition of the social value of their work.
furthermore, according to honneth, in all cases of injustice, a denial of recognition is at 
stake. therefore, the very project of a theory of recognition becomes quite different than 
it is in taylor and fraser. since social and political movements are reactions to feelings of 
social or political injustice, a theory of recognition can be conceived of as a “normative 
grammar of social conflicts”. such a theory works toward different goals. it aims to show 
that social movements have not only utilitarian motivations, but also moral ones, and 
that the latter play a primary role in their emergence. this theory asserts that normative 
incentives are not only found in moral and legal rules, in moral consciousness and in 
practical reason, or in individual or collective deliberation--- rather, they are underpinnings 
of the normative content of given feelings. therefore, one can distinguish different claims 
at work in social movements with regard to the various types of feelings of injustice 
they are rooted in: some of these feelings refer to disrespect (a lack of recognition of the 
universal value of my freedom) while others refer to dishonour (a lack of recognition of 
the social value of my activity).
it is worth noting that in honneth, the struggle for recognition has only a loose link with 
what one usually terms “identity”. indeed, honneth states that the positive relationship 
with oneself that defines (positive) identity depends on others’ speeches and deeds, so 
that identity depends on and must be confirmed by recognition. in a way, the normativity 
of recognition rests upon individual efforts to preserve an unharmed personal identity. 
however, personal identity is reduced to an abstract positive relationship with oneself 
that is specified in three forms--- self-confidence, self-respect and self-confidence--- each 
3 see fraser and honneth (2003).
4 thomson (1980).
5 see renault, “humiliation et souffrance dans l’echo des canuts”, forthcoming.
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one depending on a universal form of demand for recognition: recognition of my value 
as a body and psychic life, recognition of the value of my freedom and recognition of the 
value of my social life.6 thus, personal identity is conceived of as a mere form, and cut 
off from the content of the various collective identities that compose it. Now, the issue at 
stake is whether or not such a sharp distinction is possible between the recognition of the 
three kinds of positive relationships to oneself and the recognition of the collective parts of 
personal identity. on the level of phenomenological analysis, self-confidence, self-respect 
and self-esteem seem to be negatively linked with the various collective features of personal 
identity: racism, unemployment, stigmatization can destroy them. furthermore, it is quite 
clear that there is a positive link between these two levels of recognition. for example, when 
employees do not identify with their professional activity, they have difficulty viewing 
their wages as recognition of the social value of their existence. in many cases, though not 
in all, it is through recognition of the collective value of their professions that they can find 
recognition of the social value of their work. finally, the normative content of recognition 
has to be conceived of in a broader way so that it subsumes the recognition of personal 
identity (as positive relation to oneself) as well as the recognition of the collective identities 
which comprise it. Understood in this way, the theory of recognition provides a means 
not only for analyzing cultural politics (as in taylor) or minority politics (as in fraser), but 
also for examining the larger scale of political problems rooted in social identities.7  
II.  stRuGGlEs OF RECOGnItIOn anD PROtEst aCtIOn
Understood in this honnethian sense, the theory of recognition helps investigate the 
practical logic and the normative dynamics of protest actions. in particular, it can describe 
the continuity between pre-political and political protest actions.8 
one is often tempted to refuse to give pre-political protest actions (such as riots or other 
forms of collective violence) any kind of legitimacy. however, it would be wrong to 
conclude that a feeling is always irrational when it is not rationally articulated, or that 
legitimacy depends only on universal rights and social justice, separate from individual 
motivations and psychological factors. the ethics of recognition can be used to elaborate a 
normative framework at the level of motivation for protest actions in order to describe its 
normative dynamic and its specific claims to validity. it can be used to show how various 
forms of the social denial of recognition can lead individuals to react in different ways 
and with different means against the social injustice they experience. furthermore, it can 
be seen that the motivational basis for political action (in the classical sense of the term) 
is not a positive representation of moral principles. rather, it comes from experiences of 
what is no longer bearable, i.e. feelings and practical reactions to peculiar social situations. 
Under these conditions, the theory of recognition helps to disclose the political content of 
some apparently pre-political protest actions. an analysis of the demand for “respect” in 
6 see honneth (1995).
7 see renault (2004a).
8 see renault (2004b, chap. 1).
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the french revolts of “Banlieues”, in November 2005, provides a good illustration of such 
possible disclosure.9 politicians, journalists and social scientists have usually said that this 
revolt was not political because they were surprised by the lack of political demands and 
because they assumed that the demand for respect was not political. however, it is unclear 
whether the social disrespect that young immigrants constantly face (unemployment, 
geographical marginalization and racism) is completely unrelated to social injustice. since 
violence here is consciously oriented against symbols of social injustice it can be said that 
it has political content. 
such dynamics of politicization, based on a lack of recognition, can be described at the 
very level of individual interactions. for instance, the punk movement, at its beginning, 
might be described as an attempt to politicize ordinary interactions by seeking to transpose 
society’s condescension, fixed on the young unemployed men and women of the english 
working class.10 instead of merely reversing the stigma, the punks engaged in a struggle 
of recognition by identifying themselves (their body, their clothes) with what was socially 
considered to be the most unbearable in order to denounce both social structures and 
conventions and their social fate. here again, politicians as well as journalists and social 
scientists reduced punk practices to psychological reactions (teenager revolt) or to cultural 
movements (an esthetics of chaos or a dada avant-guard). even if the punk movement 
has always used a classical political discourse (that of anarchism above all), many are still 
unable to describe what was (and still is) political in such practices, and therefore conclude 
that these discourses are only superficial.  
even when protest actions are more classically associated with articulated political 
discourses, one has to admit that the logic of political action cannot only be conceived of 
as an effort toward consensus. it can also be conceived of according to an agonistic logic. 
one problem we face is deciding how political theory must articulate these two dimensions. 
the theory of recognition offers a model for how to think of such an articulation and how 
to distinguish its different forms.11 When individuals or social groups are victims of a 
denial of recognition, the only means for them to obtain recognition is through a struggle 
of recognition. such a struggle, however, can have two forms: an agonistic or a consensual 
struggle of recognition. only the latter deserves the term “struggle for recognition”. 
in some cases, a struggle aims only to make the denial of recognition disappear. to 
achieve this goal, it seeks to alter the social context at work in the denial of recognition, 
for instance, by trying to increase wages for the devaluated professions, or by enforcing 
laws that forbid humiliating treatments. But this goal can also be worked out by attempts 
to alter the actions of those individuals that are producing the denial of recognition. this 
is the case when a struggle of recognition seeks to obtain, by violent means, what it fails 
to achieve through non-violence. By simply being engaged unwillingly in a struggle with 
them, individuals and groups who deny recognition to others must take notice of the 
existence of the victims of their denial. furthermore, if they lose the struggle, they may 
9 see renault (2007b).
10 see. renault, Zeneidi (2008a). see also Zeneidi (2008b).
11 deranty and renault (2007a).
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be forced to change their behavior. punk politics provides us with a particularly good 
illustration of such a political strategy.
other struggles of recognition are clearly oriented toward consensus. this is the case when 
one group wants to convince another group to recognize its right to practice a given religion 
or to speak a given language. in such instances (and only in such instances), struggles of 
recognition are struggles for recognition. insofar as all struggles of recognition are initiated 
by a symbolic conflict (that of denial of recognition), the struggle for recognition is here a 
struggle for reconciliation. these struggles are unlike agonistic struggles of recognition, 
such as punk politics where, on the one hand, the struggle wants to deepen the conflict 
(spreading it even in the most simple and ordinary street interactions) in order to find 
a solution and, on the other hand, embed the conflict beneath the level of language, 
intervening only violently (with music and mottos) in the public political sphere. indeed, 
these agonistic struggles of recognition are not totally cut off from struggles for recognition, 
but struggles for recognition only take place inside of the struggling group. 
as a matter of fact, the relationship between recognition and reconciliation raises a tricky 
problem. at first glance, the idea of recognition evokes that of reconciliation, and many 
critics of honneth (and others) charge the theory of recognition with presupposing a 
“consensual” definition of politics or with presupposing that “social reconciliation” is 
possible. as i have suggested, such criticisms result mainly from confusion between 
struggles of recognition and struggles for recognition. this confusion could be traced back 
to the current hegel reception. curiously, hegel is usually viewed as the philosopher of 
“struggles for recognition”, whereas in his mature works, he mainly speaks of the “struggle 
of recognizing”.12 conversely, one might argue that when struggles of recognition lose 
their consensual strive, they also lose all their normative content. still, agonistic struggles 
of recognition remain intimately associated with a consensual dimension insofar as the 
experience of injustice, triggering the dynamic of refusal, is associated with a positive 
counterpart, a kind of telos of a more egalitarian distribution of recognition in society. 
When individuals and groups fight against social contempt, they do not just fight 
against individuals and groups denying them recognition.  rather, they are more or less 
explicitly driven by a normative dynamic aiming at a social order which would provide 
self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem to all individuals. it is clear that this telos 
belongs to the normative dynamic of protest and political actions but not necessarily to 
their explicit goals.
another important point is that the denial of recognition implies a practical dynamic (of 
escape, resistance or adaptation): a critique of the social principle that justifies what is 
unbearable and an attempt to articulate claims.13 in its development, a social movement 
elaborates some kind of self-reflection on its norms and aims, as well as a characterization 
of its enemies and allies. a political discourse results form this self-reflection and this 
discourse has to be judged from a normative standpoint. one interest of the theory of 
12 see renault, “reconnaissance: qu’est-ce que le modèle hégélien?”, forthcoming.
13 see renault (2004b, chap. 1).
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recognition is to show that the question of the normative dynamic of political action must 
be distinguished from the question of the value of the means and ends of political action, 
and considered as such. some political action may rest upon legitimate claims without 
working towards a legitimate aim, or without using legitimate means (for example, in 
the case of urban collective violence). another interest is to take the standpoint of this 
normative dynamic itself to propose a truly political judgment on the value of these aims. 
Note that this is a significant departure from taking an external standpoint, like a moral 
or legal one, or from taking even the standpoint of institutionalized political language. 
it is clear, however, that not every struggle against denials of recognition is political. it is 
only when individuals and groups are fighting against the denial of recognition produced 
by the institutions of social life that their struggle is political and that it really involves 
political normativity. conversely, it is only if the theory of recognition is able to explain 
when institutions produce recognition or denial of recognition that it is able to make the 
political aspects and the normative dynamics of social conflicts explicit.
III.  VaRIOus FORms OF stRuGGlE OF RECOGnItIOn
in order to distinguish the different forms of struggles of recognition, one has to begin by 
differentiating between various kinds of denials of recognition.14 as fraser plainly states, 
institutions produce effects of recognition because they incarnate normative schemes: 
they discriminate amongst individuals according to the normative assumptions of their 
functioning. institutions, however, refer to various kinds of normative principles: rules, 
norms and identities.
insofar as the rules of interaction condition the way others behave towards me, they 
have a direct influence on the recognition (or lack thereof) of my individual value. rules 
of interaction necessitate the attribution of a social role to an agent, a qualification of the 
action and a context of action in which others intervene. these evaluations of the agent 
and his partners, through the rules of interaction, produce effects of recognition and 
possible denials of recognition. this type of a denial of recognition is specifically linked 
to rules and could be termed depreciating recognition. it can take three different forms: 
1. devaluation or recognition as inferior, recognition of an individual as a subordinate 
partner in a hierarchical context of action, for example, a worker in his relationship with 
the foreman. 2. disqualification or recognition of an individual as not fulfilling the criteria 
which define a partner of interaction, whatever the context of action, for example, a young 
immigrants refused entry to a night-club. 3. stigmatisation, the recognition of an individual 
as an agent of noxious or condemnable actions, a typical experience for romani people. 
a second type of denial of recognition concerns the mobilization of subjectivities by norms. 
the institutional coordination of actions through rules is often reinforced by the intervention 
of norms, to which individuals attempt to conform, and through specific mechanisms 
that aim to have individuals adjust their behaviour to these norms. for instance, let us 
14 for a development of this typology, see renault (2008a).
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think of the valorisation of self-presentation and a specific knowing-“how-to-be” within 
school institutions and in workplaces.15 the resulting effects of subjectivation can bring 
about a new type of denial of recognition. in institutions that offer recognition only to 
those individuals who strive to stick as closely as possible to their predetermined roles, 
the denial of recognition takes the form of misrecognition. here, the denial of recognition 
is produced by social identification itself, and no longer by social evaluations associated 
with social identification. the first type of misrecognition is inadequate recognition, when 
individuals within institutions are forced to embrace roles with which they cannot identify. 
a typical example is that of employees who have to fit completely with the “culture” of 
their firm in order to get hired, even if they cannot identify themselves with their job. 
the second type of misrecognition is invisibility16, for example, the racial invisibility of 
blacks17, the gendered invisibility of domestic work18, or the social invisibility of industrial 
workers.19 the third is “over-visibility”, for example the over-visibility through which 
a black man becomes nothing other than a black20, or the over-visibility through which 
europeans sometimes feel invaded by arabs.21
a third type of denial of recognition has to do with the constitution of identity. throughout 
socialization, the different institutional spaces allow each individual a representation of 
the specificity and value of their existence. in that sense, they become spaces in which the 
different components of personal identity are constituted. in fact, in this case, the effect 
of recognition is twofold since socialization and the constitution of identities must not be 
viewed as the imposition of social norms on an uninformed subjectivity.  rather, these 
processes must be understood as a means by which subjective transaction, the unification 
by the individual of the different components of his identity, parallels a process of objective 
transaction between his own expectations and those of the institution. in such a process 
of subjectivation, recognition relates to identity both as something that conditions it and 
something that is conditioned by it. this specific function of recognition leads to a third 
type of denial of recognition which i term unsatisfactory recognition. effects of subjectivation 
are unsatisfactory when they do not allow individuals to fully identify with the different 
roles they would like society to recognize. the problem here is not that the individual 
does not achieve recognition of the manner in which he/she embraces these roles, which 
would be misrecognition, but that these different roles pile themselves up in him/her 
without him/her being able to achieve a personal unification that would give him/her 
the feeling of being recognized through them. the problem is not that social identification 
contradicts the expectation of recognition, but that there is a contradiction in the expectation 
of recognition itself. such a denial of recognition can take two forms: the first is that of 
15 for a critical study of the demand and evaluation of the “how-to-be: in the new management, see Neyrat 
(2001).
16 see honneth (2003a). on invisibility, see also voirol (2005).
17 see ellison (1947).
18 see Recherches féministes, 1999: “invisibles et visibles”.
19 see Beaud and pialoux (1999).
20 fanon (1952), ch. 4.
21 one may question whether what Butler terms the invisibility of transgender individual is not rather a mix of 
invisibility and over-visibility (see Butler, 2006).
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unstable recognition. this is the situation where the individual drifts between social roles 
without being able to unify them in a coherent narrative so that he/she cannot give his/
her existence a satisfying meaning. such a situation is described by richard sennett in his 
book The Corrosion of Character, with reference to the new workers of flexible capitalism.22 
the second type of denial of recognition is unsatisfactory recognition which takes the form 
of a recognition that splits or tears apart subjectivity in those cases where an institutional 
context makes strong identifications possible but also incompatible. this is the case when, 
as early as primary socialization, individuals are caught up in institutional mechanisms 
that are not necessarily compatible. a classical illustration is the situation of second or 
third generation immigrants who find it difficult to unify cultural codes from the family 
sphere with codes from school and other spaces of social life.
institutional 
mechanisms 
identification of partner 
in action 
mobilisation of 
subjectivities
identity construction in 
socialisation processes
genres of denial of 
recognition
depreciative recognition misrecognition Unsatisfactory recognition
subgenres of denial of 
recognition
–devaluing
–disqualifying
–stigmatising
–inadequate recognition
–invisibility
–overvisibility
–unstable
–splitting or tearing apart
a reason why the normative dynamics of struggles of recognition are not easy to describe 
is that these various forms of denial of recognition often interfere. in such cases, it is 
always a problem for the individual or the group concerned to identify the best way to 
struggle against the denial of recognition. this problem leads us to the classical issue of the 
intersection between different kinds of domination: when one suffers from class contempt, 
racist discrimination, stigmatisation, invisibility or over-visibility, sexist discrimination 
or invisibility, the distinction between allies and enemies is unclear or the strategies of 
struggle often end up in an aporia. these aporia may result from possible conflicts between 
objectives –for instance, it is often the case that poor people and immigrants are accused of 
sexism–; or, result from a conflit between strategies - for instance, a struggle for visibility 
is always a struggle for recognition, but the repertories of collective action for struggles 
for recognition and struggles for visibility are quite different.
moreover, when various types of denials of recognition are intertwined, it is difficult 
to know which motivation plays the greater role in the emergence and development of 
the collective mobilization. this analytical problem is deepened by the fact that explicit 
demands of recognition are not always the same as those that are at stake in real practices. 
individuals are usually not aware of their expectations of recognition, and it is only after a 
denial of recognition that they are made explicit through claims. Yet, this reflexive stance 
is far from being free from psychological and social constraints. different processes can 
impede individuals to admit or to articulate their expectations of recognition. for instance, 
22 sennett (1998). 
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it has been noted that employees admit to expecting recognition from their colleagues 
while it is often recognition from those higher up that they value more.23 
another analytical problem is that claims of recognition can have different statuses. 
positive recognition can constitute the core of a claim, but it can also have only a strategic 
function. indeed, social groups can seek to be recognized through normative principles 
which constitute no more than a means of improving their position in society. for instance, 
ferdinand sütterluty has analyzed how, in germany, an association of muslim immigrants 
from turkey offered to donate blood to the red cross.24 the red cross was the recipient 
of this proposal because of its symbolic weight (christian, it is the symbol of german 
recognition) and also because of the universality proclaimed in its charter (all can be 
helped and all can participate regardless of their origin or religion). this association of 
immigrants is perfectly aware of the prejudices held by the red cross against “turkish 
blood”. Basically, it is this awareness that led the group to carry out their symbolic struggle 
on this front. its political objective was not to benefit from the universal recognition it is 
supposed to allow, but only to use the official universalism of the red cross to force it to 
recognize the dignity of “turkish blood”, and thus to use its symbolic prestige to improve 
its place in the society.
if one relies exclusively on Bourdieu’s theory, the issue of recognition would be reduced to 
conflicts that oppose groups in order to impose their vision of the world, and the struggle of 
recognition would only have a strategic function, such as the one just mentioned.25 however, 
we have seen that there are many reasons to assert that some struggles of recognition are 
rooted in the normative content of personal identity and thus cannot be interpreted solely 
in a strategic way. if one relies exclusively on the model set up by fraser, one should only 
take into account those non-strategic struggles of recognition that are restricted to problems 
about the social status of groups, according to a strict opposition between recognition 
and redistribution. But there are many reasons to think that problems of distribution are 
also lived and experienced as problems of recognition by the individuals involved, and 
that the experience of injustice, in general, is an experience of a denial of recognition. if 
one relies exclusively on the theory worked out by honneth, one would have to identify 
all struggles against the denial of recognition as struggles for recognition. But, as i have 
suggested, it is useful to distinguish agonistic from consensual struggles of recognition. 
Ultimately, it is preferable in an analysis of claims of recognition to use the whole range 
of distinctions that has just been presented (typology of denial of recognition, distinction 
between implicit and explicit recognition expectations, distinction between instrumental 
and normative struggles of recognition, of agonistic and consensual ones) in order to 
avoid unilateral analyses that run the risk of theoretical simplification and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of their specific political contents and legitimacy.
23 Kocyba (2007).
24 sutterlüty (2006).
25 for a critical discussion of Bourdieu’s theory of recognition, see voirol (2004).
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